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Germany is frequently perceived as a fore-
runner in environmental policy, in particu-
lar after the turnover in government in 
1998. We contribute to the debate on ca-
pacities for environmental policy by ex-
plaining this position with the specific ac-
tors configuration in the German policy 
network. The paper describes and analy-
ses the German policy-network that formu-
lates the national position in international 
climate change negotiations. We ask what 
activities have been performed by the 
members of this network regarding the in-
troduction of an eco-taxation, analyse 
what resources the various organisations 
dispose of, and in how far the organisa-
tions are interrelated among each other 
regarding the exchange of information, 
cooperation and opposition. We conclude 
that NGOs are well integrated despite of 
comparable low financial resources. The 
network is not fragmented, and coalitions 
are possible among the different types of 
actors. This may contribute to the explana-
tion of the German position, however, 
comparative research is needed. 

 Introduction 
During the past decade Germany has at-
tracted attention in many countries be-
cause of its environmental politics and 
policies. Germany has become a forerun-
ner in the conceptionalization of the Kreis-
laufwirtschaftsgesetz, it has become fa-
mous for its highly sophisticated and wide-
spread separation and collection of gar-
bage and recycling and not least it has 
fundamentally changed its energy policy 
by incorporating environmental issues. 
The ecological tax reform, the phasing out 
of nuclear power and the revision of the 
energy feed in law characterise a profound 
change in Germany’s approach towards 
climate change since 1998 (Mez 2003). 
Compared to many other countries, Ger-
many is a frontrunner of climate policy at 
the national level as well as in international 
negotiations. What is specific about Ger-
man national policy-making, that led to this 
role? 
Comparative policy research reveals that 
there are considerable differences in the 
willingness and ability to adopt and imple-
ment innovative policy measures. The 
characteristics of the countries need to be 
analysed to explain this variation. For in-
stance, CO2 and new energy taxes were 
adopted by Scandinavian countries in the 
early 1990s. Other early adopters were 
rather small European countries e.g. Bel-
gium, Austria or Slovenia. It was only in 
1999, when larger countries, in particular 
Germany and Italy, adopted these meas-
ures as well (Tews 2002). Thus, additional 
momentum for the diffusion of CO2/energy 
taxes is to be expected. 
CO2 or energy taxes are an particularly in-
teresting object to study: They are a stan-
dard measure in environmental policy and 
relatively easy to compare. Although they 
vary considerably regarding the tariffs and 
the scope their introduction is – unlike 
many other policy instruments – hardly a 
symbolic policy only. Usually the adoption 
of a CO2 /energy tax is fiercely debated in 
a country, because it is a redistributive 
measure. Therefore, countries that have 
introduced such a tax can be expected to 
dispose over a relatively high environ-
mental policy capacity. 
The following graph indicates that up to 
now only few countries introduced such an 
instrument. 
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Figure 1: The Diffusion of CO2 and energy taxes. 
 
Source: Busch and Jörgens 2003 
In this paper, we take Germany as an ex-
ample of a country that successfully intro-
duced a new energy tax in 1999. Our pur-
pose is to analyse the actors constellation 
of environmental policy making in Ger-
many, thereby contributing to a micro-
foundation of the theory of environmental 
policy capacity. 
Differences between national political out-
puts have been explained by differences in 
the constellation of actors, policy strate-
gies, policy style, problem structure and 
the like (Jänicke 1996: 13-24). A crucial 
point whether or not the political system is 
able to respond to environmental chal-
lenges proactively seems to be the degree 
of integration of leading societal actors into 
the policy-making process and their ca-
pacity to build coalitions (Kitschelt 1986, 
Sabatier 1993). A close interrelationship 
among the various political actors may 
also contribute to a faster and easier diffu-
sion of ideas compared to fragmented sys-
tems. However, such an openness of the 
political system is also an openness for 
actors that resist ambitious environmental 
policies. Countries vary regarding the de-
gree of inclusion of environmental organi-
sations that in turn may explain policy out-
puts. This requires an analysis that goes 
beyond the description of the formal sys-
tem. The constellations of actors in terms 
of power relations between the most influ-
ential actors in the environmental field and 
their "will and skill" (Shonfield) to form 
strategic alliances to promote environ-
mental policy, seem to be crucial for the 
quality of political outputs. This approach 
is part of the debate on the nation states´ 
capacity for proactive environmental pol-
icy. This paper contributes to this debate 
by a quantitative analysis of the policy 
network of actors that are concerned with 
international climate change issues in 
Germany1. Based on the analysis of the 
                                                
1 Comparative research on eco-networks is cur-
rently conducted in cooperation with Yutaka Tsu-
jinaka from Tsukuba University. Empirical re-
search in Germany was sponsored by the Ministry 
of Education of Japan. 
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German example being a relatively pio-
neer in environmental policy making we 
analyse in how far there is the inclusion of 
actors and the openness of the political 
system and we discuss in how far this may 
be an impediment or an opportunity for the 
advancement of environmental policy 
making. 
The paper starts with some remarks con-
cerning the methodological and theoretical 
framework of our empirical research. Then 
the German network is described in terms 
of its size, composition and main interests. 
In section three the network is analysed 
with regard to patterns of interaction. In-
teraction will be explored by three main 
variables, namely information exchange, 
cooperation and opposition. In a final step 
we will relate the data to the policy output 
and the functioning of the network. 
Our survey: methodological remarks 
Our survey intends to broaden the empiri-
cal database concerning environmental 
policy networks by using quantitative data 
from interviews with leading experts of the 
German actors’ network. We aim to iden-
tify the relevant actors in the German pol-
icy network and to analyse the patterns of 
interaction between them. Environmental 
policy is a highly differentiated policy field 
that encompasses many different issues. 
We focused on the policy network that is 
concerned with the formulation of Ger-
many’s position in the field of global cli-
mate change. A huge number of policy ac-
tors is involved in the formulation and im-
plementation of policies, in particular in a 
policy field such as climate change which 
affects almost every industrial sector, pri-
vate households, a wide range of govern-
ment agencies, different scientific disci-
plines and almost every environmental or-
ganisation.  
Our aim was to identify those actors that 
are part of the network for a longer period 
of time and that are either close to or ac-
tually involved in the process of decision 
making. In order to identify these core 
members of our network we applied a two 
step procedure: At first we prepared a pre-
liminary list of representatives of organisa-
tions and institutions that have been 
members of institutions such as national 
advisory councils, parliamentary commit-
tees etc. or have been participants of 
COPs, important parliamentary hearings, 
etc. We included only those individuals 
that were participants of more than one of 
these conferences or being a member of 
more than one organisation respectively. 
We then asked experts from science, poli-
tics and industry to assess our preliminary 
list in how far the actors identified actually 
constitute the German policy network. The 
result was a list of 92 actors that represent 
a range of different national organisations. 
We classified these actors within four 
categories: governmental representatives, 
researchers, representatives from NGOs 
and industrial associations. 
53 of them allowed for a complete inter-
view to be conducted, i.e. the return rate 
was 57,6%. The interviews were based on 
a questionnaire which had been originally 
prepared by Tsujinaka Yutaka from Tsu-
kuba University in order to provide data 
suitable for comparative purposes. This 
has been translated into German and 
adapted to the German context. Interviews 
were conducted by telephone in 2000 and 
lasted between 32 and 159 minutes each. 
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Capacity-building as a theoretical framework 
In order to explain political outputs, inter-
national comparisons of the environmental 
performance of nation states have proved 
to be useful (see Jänicke and Weidner 
1995; Jänicke 1996). They indicate that 
the effectiveness of political systems 
highly depends on 
• relative strength, 
• cooperation, and 
• integration 
of the actors involved in the policy-making 
process. 
The relative strength of different govern-
mental and societal actors is a fundamen-
tal variable for the explanation of any pol-
icy outcome. It is, however, difficult to 
measure since there are different sources 
of power. Organisations may be powerful 
because of their economic resources 
(number of members, employees, turn-
over, etc.), their institutional influence (e.g. 
veto power), their knowledge and compe-
tence or their credibility in public opinion. 
The ability of a policy actor to influence a 
decision depends on several sources of 
power, that may be, to a certain degree, 
mutually substitutive. 
Cooperation refers to the ability and readi-
ness of the political and societal actors to 
cooperate in problem solving. Political sys-
tems with a cooperative culture can be ex-
pected to be more effective than those 
with conflictual structures. Conflicts are 
considered as a waste of resources in 
terms of time, money and intellectual en-
ergy. Moreover conflicts are considered to 
provoke fragmentation if opponents are 
not successfully integrated in the policy-
process. The political systems of different 
countries vary considerably regarding the 
degree of integration and fragmentation 
among different sectors and levels of pol-
icy-making. In particular in cross cutting 
issues that affect almost every sector of 
government, such as the environment, it is 
necessary that the different departments 
cooperate in problem solving. Cooperation 
among different actors is facilitated by a 
balanced level of competence between 
these actors. 
Thus, the policy-making system should be 
inclusive, integrating all societal actors, 
since only integration and consensual pro-
ceeding offer best conditions for success-
ful implementation. The degree of integra-
tion depends on institutional means of par-
ticipation, as well as on discourse culture 
and personal factors. Political systems 
vary considerably in their degree of inte-
grating new and rather weak interests and 
their corresponding organisations. Com-
pared to traditional interest groups such as 
industrial associations or trade unions en-
vironmental NGOs are usually much 
weaker and less established regarding 
their participation in political institutions. 
Notwithstanding differences in the strength 
of environmental organisations, some 
countries are more open in integrating 
newly arising and weaker interests than 
others. 
From this reasoning we can expect that 
political systems, that are open for the in-
clusion of different actors and their inter-
ests are likely to perform better regarding 
their environmental policy output. Open-
ness of the political system refers to free 
and equal access of the actors to informa-
tion and participation. Even though it re-
mains arguable whether NGOs can play 
more than an additive role to state inter-
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vention in the field of global environmental 
policy, it is plausible that the integration of 
NGOs in the policy process is enlarging 
the governments’ intervention capacity 
and the democratic legitimisation of the 
process (Brunnengräber and Walk 1997: 
71). 
There is a considerable body of literature 
about the growing importance of policy 
networks in policy-making. It has been ar-
gued, that the emergence of networks to-
gether with the mutual dependency of 
networks’ state and non-state members 
may limit the possibilities for intervention 
of public policy makers (Kenis and 
Schneider 1991; Marin and Mayntz 1991; 
Mayntz 1993). The network approach to 
policy analysis contradicts the assumption 
of the state as the major authority in influ-
encing and controlling societal activities 
(Mayntz 1993: 40). Instead, the emer-
gence of policies is perceived as a proc-
ess that includes both private and public 
actors. Policy networks are defined as 
prevailing informal, but stable relations be-
tween actors that have different, but mutu-
ally dependent relations (Kenis 1991: 
299). The merits of an inclusive approach 
in policy-making can be expected in the 
inclusion of major interests. Therefore, 
during the course of the decision making 
process, relevant information is likely to be 
considered and the implementation of 
policies should be easier than in hierarchi-
cal mode.  
If the argument is true that the way of net-
working between major actors in the envi-
ronmental field influences the quality of 
political outputs, we could explain the pro-
active environmental policy Germany has 
developed in the course of climate change 
policy process by actors constellation, i.e. 
the relative strength of environmental in-
terests, the degree of cooperation, inclu-
siveness and integration. We will try to 
verify our argument by analysing data ob-
tained through interviews based on the fol-
lowing three categories of variables: 
• Variables concerning history and re-
sources of the organisation that are rep-
resented by the interviewed actors, 
• Variables concerning information ex-
change, cooperation and opposition with 
regard to 132 national and international 
actors in the field of global environment 
policy 
• Variables concerning ascribed influence, 
interest and activities of the addressed 
organisation. 
The analysis of the data in this paper fo-
cuses on: 
• Exchange of information and the exis-
tence of scientific communities, both of 
which are important for the profession-
alisation of relevant actors. 
• Inter- and intra group cooperation of the 
network in the policy-making process, 
which is regarded to be important for 
consensus building. 
• Level of inclusiveness of the policy net-
work. 
The climate policy network: Size and resources 
The organisations that form Germany’s 
present environmental policy-making net-
work have been founded in three waves 
with peaks in 1949/50, 1972-1975 and 
1990/91 respectively. The first peak in 
1949/50 was due to Germany’s post-war 
democratization. During these years inter-
est groups and institutions proliferated, al-
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though unrelated to environmental issues. 
While only six organisations of the network 
were established between 1950 and 1970, 
their number rose to 15 between 1971 and 
1990. The years between 1972 and 1975 
constitute a period of institutionalization of 
environmental policy in West Germany. In 
1971 the Sachverständigenrat für Umwelt-
fragen was established that evolved to the 
leading advisory board of the government. 
In 1974 the Federal Environmental Agency 
was established and the ruling Social De-
mocratic Party presented the first envi-
ronmental program. Furthermore, the anti-
nuclear energy movement gained momen-
tum during these years. During the eight-
ies this actors experienced a period of 
consolidation. The Green Party gained in-
creasing influence and electoral success, 
including participation in government coali-
tions at state [Länder] and local levels. In 
1986 the conservative government created 
a ministry of the environment. Triggered 
by the Chernobyl disaster the anti-nuclear 
energy movement experienced further 
mobilization. Independent environmental 
research institutes like the Öko-Institut 
e.V. (1977), the Katalyse Institute (1978), 
IÖW (1985) or ISOE (1989) were estab-
lished during the eighties, constituting the 
core of an emergent environmental epis-
temic community. 
It is important to note the coincidence of 
the establishment of environmental or-
ganisations and institutions and the envi-
ronmental movement during those years in 
relation to the rise of personal networks 
between the expanding networks’ pro-
tagonists. Most of them had received their 
political socialisation in the context of the 
students movement or had already been 
members of the environmental movement 
during the 70s. The third peak, including 
the proliferation of ten new organisations 
in 1990 and 1991 alone, might have partly 
been a side-effect of German reunification 
which gave an impetus to the institutionali-
zation of environmental interests in the 
former GDR. Besides, this increase needs 
to be considered in the context of the 
globalization of the environmental agenda 
and the emergence of the climate change 
issue in the run up to the Rio summit of 
1992. 
Altogether we identified 92 national or-
ganisations, that representing the actors of 
today’s policy network. We classify them 
into four categories: 
• 29 government units/departments, con-
sisting both of executive and legislative 
institutions such as ministries, political 
parties and parliamentary groups, and 
advisory committees. Even though for-
mer research (Jänicke 1990) indicates 
that the influence of political parties in 
power is small, it is an interesting point 
for analysis whether the participation of 
the Green Party in the coalition govern-
ment since 1998 does matter in this re-
spect. 
• 27 research units/institutes. They in-
clude highly engaged environmental re-
search institutes like the Öko-Institut 
and the Wuppertal Institute for Climate 
Environment and Energy as well as es-
tablished national economic research 
institutes, like the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW) and the 
Hamburg Institute for Economic Re-
search (HWWA), all of which entered 
into the climate change debate with re-
search on economic, social, and eco-
logical effects of the eco-tax that was 
proposed and introduced in Germany. 
• The third category are NGOs in the field 
of climate change policy, nine of which 
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were named to play an important role. 
All of them with the are nation-wide or-
ganisations dealing with environmental 
protection, energy, and ecology. 
• The forth category consists of 27 inter-
est groups from business, labour un-
ions, foundations, and corporations. The 
variety within this group is broad, rang-
ing from associations representing en-
ergy and car businesses and labour un-
ions from the public sector to founda-
tions sponsoring, amongst other things, 
environmental research. 
Table 1 demonstrates that with the excep-
tion of the NGOs the network is balanced 
with close to equal representation of gov-
ernmental units, research institutes, and 
other interest groups. The number of 
NGOs in the network is small, but most of 
them are big organisations with a strong 
environmental expertise like Greenpeace 
Germany, BUND and NABU. 
Table 1: The German Ecological Network 
Type of organisation Total number (A) Completed interviews (B) 
Share of sample 
(%) 
Group specific re-
turn rate (B/A) (%)
Governmental units 29 12 22,6 41,4 
Research units 27 16 30,2 57,1 
Other interest groups 27 17 32,1 65,4 
NGO 9 8 15,1 88,9 
Total 92 53 100,0 57,6  
 
The institutionalization of the environ-
mental policy-making network since the 
70s implies the availability of human, intel-
lectual and financial resources. Thus, it 
has been argued that the existence of a 
broad and highly professionalized network 
of institutions related to the environment is 
a precondition for pro-active environmental 
policy, even though their mere existence 
does not guarantee the quality of political 
outputs (Jörgens 1996: 110-111). What is 
important, too, is the distribution of re-
sources among the members of the net-
work and their modus of interaction. 
Resources 
It has been argued that the decisive pre-
conditions for equal participation opportu-
nities are—besides legal provisions—
financial and human resources as well as 
access to information . The size—in terms 
of membership—of organisations and in-
stitutions of the network may influence vot-
ing behaviour. Money determines the 
number of technical and professional staff 
and may influence the forms of activities 
as well as the scope of campaigns. Be-
cause of this it has become a common-
place to argue that the crucial point for 
equal participation opportunities in envi-
ronmental policy is the access to re-
sources. 
All of our data indicates that among the 
actors of the network NGOs are the weak-
est in terms of human and financial re-
sources. In our interviews we asked how 
many employees are in charge of actually 
influencing the political process (“watch-
dog”), or are mainly concerned with the 
collection of technical data on global envi-
ronmental change respectively. 
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Table 2: Number of employees in Germany who are responsible for performing “watch-dog” 
functions (%) 







1 - 10 persons 18,2 15,4 62,5 6,3 
11 - 20 persons 0,0 7,7 25,0 12,5 
21 - 50 persons 18,2 15,4 12,5 12,5 
51 - 100 persons 9,1 7,7 0,0 6,3 
101 - 1000 persons 18,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 
over 1000 persons 9,1 17,7 0,0 25,0 
not applicable 27,3 38,5 0,0 37,5 
Table 3: Number of employees in Germany who are in charge of the collection and analysis 
of technical data (%) 







1 - 10 persons 9,1 38,5 50,0 43,8 
11 - 20 persons 18,2 7,7 12,5 12,5 
21 - 50 persons 9,1 23,1 12,5 16,3 
51 - 100 persons 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
101 - 1000 persons 9,1 0,0 0,0 6,3 
over 1000 persons 9,1 7,7 0,0 0,0 
not applicable 45,5 15,4 25,0 31,3 
 
When comparing the number of profes-
sional staff of all organisations of the net-
work, it becomes clear that the NGOs 
have the smallest number of employees 
who are responsible for both “watch-dog” 
functions and data collection. 
90% of the NGOs interviewed employ less 
than 50 persons in a “watchdog”--function, 
62,5% mention less than 10 persons. The 
same is true in the case of employees who 
are in charge of the collection and analysis 
of technical data. Here, all NGOs with 
technical staff rely on less than 50 per-
sons, while, for instance, 18,2% of gov-
ernment units and 6,3% of the other inter-
est groups have more than 101 profes-
sionals assigned to this duty. Budgets of 
NGOs are lower, too, since they mainly 
depend on membership fees and dona-
tions. Low budgets only allow for low 
budget campaigns like in the case of the 
eco-tax decision making process (Reiche 
and Krebs 1999: 291). In terms of re-
sources NGOs are definitely not competi-
tive with the interest groups from business. 
At the same time the case study on the 
eco-tax debate makes clear that NGOs 
had a considerable influence in the deci-
sion making process (Reiche and Krebs 
1999). It was mainly due to the lobbying of 
Greenpeace that the eco-tax issue gained 
momentum after 1994. Therefore we may 
argue that it would be too easy to reduce 
the question of influence and access to the 
political process only to financial and per-
sonnel resources. According to the organi-
sations of the network, expertise and 
closeness to the government are much 
more important than these resources. 
When asked about the most effective 
sources of influence, the majority of inter-
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viewees states a high quality of scientific 
and technical staff (41,5%), followed by 
good relations with the government 
(35,8%) and strong engagement in global 
environmental policies (34%), while capa-
ble policy staff plays a subordinate role 
(22,6%). Resource issues such as mem-
bership are mentioned by only 13,2%, 
quality and quantity of general staff by 
15,1%, legal staff by 9,4%, and budget by 
3,8% as an important precondition for in-
fluence. Financial and personell resources 
therefore may play a smaller role than ex-
pected. 
Issues and Actions 
Since the early 90s climate change policy 
is based on international agreements like 
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto protocol and 
Agenda 21. With regard to the reduction of 
greenhouse gases on the national level 
the issue of climate change policy is 
closely related to energy policy and the 
structure and quantity of energy produc-
tion and consumption. In the case of Ger-
many one crucial point for the ruling par-
ties has always been the problem of how 
to deal with the national coal production 
which is strongly intertwined with eco-
nomic as well as labour interests. Nuclear 
energy, from its beginning, has been op-
posed by strong citizens’ movements 
which succeeded more than once in pre-
venting the construction of a nuclear 
power plant. It lost the acceptance of the 
general public at the latest in the wake of 
the Chernobyl accident. The dependence 
on the supply of oil is comparatively low 
because of diversified sources from the 
North Sea, Russia and the Middle East. 
One of the mostly debated issues related 
to energy policy between 1979 and 1998 
has been the concept of an ecological tax 
reform (Priewe 1998). The typical cleav-
age between economy and ecology in the 
environmental arena appeared in this case 
in a rather representative way: Among the 
political parties, the Green Party, the So-
cialists (PDS) and the Social Democrats 
were in favour of such a tax, but the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Liberal Democratic 
Party were only ready to support its intro-
duction in the case of an EU-wide initiative 
(Weizsäcker 1998: 42; Repnik 1998: 43; 
Hustedt 1998: 45; Homburger 1998: 47). 
With regard to research institutes the envi-
ronmental research institutes were mostly 
supportive, while the institutes in the field 
of economic research like the Hamburg 
Institute for Economic Research (HWWA) 
remained neutral. Other interest groups 
again were divided over the issue with op-
position from the Association of the Car 
Producing Industries (VdA), insurances, 
and the Association of Lignite Industries 
(Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie-Verein). 
Big labour unions supported an eco-tax, 
expecting positive effects for employment 
(Putzhammer 1998: 41). Only NGOs were 
unanimous in its support. 
Keeping in mind that resources are not 
equally distributed between organisations 
of a network, the question arises how 
members of the network became active in 
influencing the decision-making process. 
We have asked the organisations what 
kind of activities they consider to be influ-
ential and what activities they have actu-
ally employed to influence the decision 
making process on the introduction of an 
eco-tax (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Activities regarding the introduction of eco-taxation 
 
 
Figure 2 reflects the pattern of action of 
the network in favour of the introduction of 
the eco-tax. The main target in the policy-
making process, for all network members, 
have been governmental institutions, in-
cluding help in drafting the bill or even 
contacting opposition parties. Only the 
NGOs have extended their activities to 
channels of directly and indirectly influenc-
ing the general public by contacting the 
mass media or through the organisation of 
mass rallies. As their resources are low we 
might argue that mobilizing the general 
public and employing the media may com-
pensate for a low number of members. 
This appears especially true with regard to 
high environmental awareness in German 
society and its tradition of direct action. 
Citizens’ movements have been active 
during the seventies all over the country 
and again after the Chernobyl accident in 
1986 . 
The Question of Power: Influence, Conflict and Cooperation 
As mentioned before climate change pol-
icy divide the network in pros and cons, 
but this does not tell us the whole story. 
With regard to the policy-making process 
the crucial point is how opposite positions 
are mediated and integrated into the proc-
ess. Therefore, we will have a look at con-
flict constellations and cooperation pat-
terns. 
To grasp the conflict potential, we have 
asked the organisations of the network 
what organisation they consider an oppo-
nent. The results are supporting our as-
sumptions but are startling still: 
The data demonstrates that NGOs and in-
terest groups are mostly involved in con-
flicts. NGOs name the highest number of 
organisations they consider to be oppo-
nents, even though the difference with 
other groups is not significant (p=0.431). 
Interest groups on the other hand are most 
frequently named as being opponents by 
the interviewed organisations, but only the 
difference of the frequency between inter-
est groups and research institutes is sig-
nificant. (p=0.010). 
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Organisations’ representatives were asked 
which other organisations (out of a list of 
48) they perceive as opponents (column 
one), it was counted how often they are 
perceived as opponents by other organisa-
tions (column two), and it was counted 
how often classification as opponent was 
mutually symmetric (column three). 
Table 4: Conflict patterns 
 
Mean number of or-
ganisations out of 48 
named as opponents
Mean frequency of being 
named by 48 network 
members as opponents 
Mean number of 
symmetric opposite 
relation 
Governmental Units (n=11) 2,45 3,45 0,27 
Research Units (n=13) 2,30 1,07 0,07 
NGOs (n=8) 6,12 3,12 1,25 
Other interest groups (n=17) 3,70 5,41 0,70 
 
The ten national organisations that were 
named most frequently as opponents are 
the Association of German Electricity Sup-
pliers (VDEW), the Association of Lignite 
Industries (Deutscher Braunkohlen-Indu-
strie-Verein), Shell, British Petroleum and 
other organisations related to the interests 
of energy suppliers. From the governmen-
tal organisations the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, the Green Party and the Chris-
tian Democratic Party are named, but no 
research institute and no NGO are men-
tioned as opponents. 
In order to get an idea of the conflict pat-
tern we will now explore the relative fre-
quency one group has named the other as 
being an opponent (table 5). 
Table 5:  Relative Frequency of Conflict 
 Governmental Units Research Units NGOs 
Other interest 
groups 
Governmental Units 0.041 0.007 0.000 0.112 
Research Units 0.021 0.053 0.019 0.072 
NGOs 0.170 0.000 0.047 0.228 
Other interest groups 0.085 0.019 0.156 0.088 
 
While conflict patterns reflect differences 
in positions, it is startling that the overall 
level of conflict is rather low. We can not 
find any open fragmentation of the net-
work. The strongest opposition we can find 
between NGOs and interest groups, while 
NGOs are not concerned about research 
institutes and show only little concern with 
regard to other NGOs. What might be in-
teresting is that the governmental units do 
not mention any problem with the NGOs, 
but name a relative high number of oppo-
site organisations in group 4 (other interest 
groups). If these answers are reliable, this 
raises the question whether party affiliation 
of the government is crucial for the posi-
tion of NGOs within the network. Weidner 
and Jänicke (1995), in their comparative 
research, did not find any case where 
party composition of the government made 
any difference, but since in 1998 the 
Green Party joined the Social Democrats 
in a coalition government, the data may al-
ready reflect closer cooperation and less 
conflict between NGOs and government 
than under conservative majorities. The 
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appearance of former environmentalists in 
public offices and the federal bureaucracy 
might be considered to benefit environ-
mental networking between NGOs, envi-
ronmental research institutes and the envi-
ronmental administration. At least in the 
case of introducing the eco-tax the inclu-
sion of the Green Party in the coalition 
government should be considered to have 
strongly favoured the introduction (Reiche 
and Krebs 1999: 294). This argument is 
well supported by data concerning infor-
mation exchange and cooperation pat-
terns. 
Open access to information is important, 
because the number and diversity of in-
formation sources at the disposal of policy-
making institutions is crucial for the pro-
fessionalisation of the network and the 
quality of political decisions. To be ac-
cepted by the network as an important in-
formation source implies influence. More-
over, beside its function of knowledge dif-
fusion, information exchange serves as an 
important step towards cooperation. 
We distinguish between the number of in-
formation contacts mentioned by the or-
ganisations of the network (A), the fre-
quency they were named as a source of 
information (B), and the number of organi-
sations with whom they exchange informa-
tion (C) (table 6). 
Table 6: Sources of information 
  
Mean number of or-
ganisations mentioned 
as information source 
(A) 
Mean frequency of be-
ing mentioned as in-
formation sources  
(B) 




Governmental Units (n=11) 32,27 32,18 24,90 
Research Units (n=13) 21,53 24,92 14,15 
NGOs (n=8) 31,87 29,00 23,37 
Other interest groups (n=17) 26,11 24,94 17,35 
 
NGOs and governmental units name the 
highest number of organisations from 
which they get information. 
Among the ten organisations with the 
highest number of information sources are 
the Ministry of the Environment, the For-
eign Ministry, the Federal Environment 
Agency, the Green Party, Greenpeace, 
BUND, Germanwatch, the Wuppertal Insti-
tute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 
and only the Association of Electricity 
Suppliers (VDEW) from the business sec-
tor. 
Most of these organisations are among 
those who were likewise named most fre-
quently by other members of the network 
as a source of information . Among the top 
ten are again the Ministry of Environment, 
the Federal Environment Agency and the 
Green Party, as well as the country’s three 
most important environmental NGOs, leav-
ing other interest groups behind them. In 
both perspectives NGOs and governmen-
tal units are mentioned more frequently 
than research units and interest groups. 
This is startling, since, in the case of the 
NGOs, it demonstrates that they do not 
only depend on expert knowledge but are 
also well accepted as independent 
sources of expertise themselves. With re-
gard to the professionalisation of the net-
work we would rather have expected a 
leading role of research institutes. How-
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ever, according to the data, they are even 
less involved than other interest groups. 
They mostly are involved in information 
exchange with the environmental admini-
stration. But while the administration con-
siders NGOs an important source of in-
formation, research institutes do not. 
When looking at the inter-group informa-
tion contacts, we find the highest relative 
frequency of contacts between the gov-
ernment units and the NGOs. Unlike our 
expectations/assumptions, NGOs do not 
depend highly on information from re-
search institutes in order to compensate 
for weak resources. Rather they have 
even more contacts with other interest 
groups, while these other interest groups, 
too, contact governmental units and NGOs 
more frequently than research institutes. 
Table 7: Relative Frequency of Information Contacts 
 Governmental Units Research Units NGOs 
Other interest 
groups 
Governmental Units 0.669 0.636 0.739 0.631 
Research Units 0.615 0.497 0.375 0.312 
NGOs 0.761 0.500 0.797 0.625 
Other interest groups 0.631 0.439 0.566 0.526 
 
Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that the gov-
ernmental units are most frequently in-
volved in gaining and providing information 
in any constellation. All other groups are 
targeting above all the environmental ad-
ministration, but the network is inclusive 
without significant differences between the 
groups in terms of information contacts. 
Beyond a mere information exchange, we 
have asked organisations about their sup-
portive relations2 with other members of 
the network. This question mainly aimed at 
the reconstruction of advocacy coalitions 
in the national policy-making process. Like 
expected, the correlation between informa-
tion exchange and support is high, i.e. 
those who maintain many contacts to ex-
                                                
2 Since the expression „cooperation“ implies 
an equal relation between at least two part-
ners, we prefer to use the term „support“ to 
indicate that an organisation may provide 
support without gaining any return for it or 
vice versa.  
change information, have many supportive 
relations, too.  
Again we differentiate between the num-
ber of organisations, which each organisa-
tion mentions as supportive, the frequency 
the same organisation is mentioned as 
supportive and the cooperation relations, 
i.e. the number of organisations, which 
were named by organisations they con-
sider themselves as supportive. Again the 
governmental units responsible for envi-
ronmental policy are at the center of the 
network, followed by the NGOs: 
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Table 8: Cooperation pattern 
 
Mean number of or-
ganisations mentioned 
as being supportive 
Mean frequency of 
being mentioned as 
supportive 
Mean number of 
cooperation relations 
Governmental Units (n=11) 15,36 16,27 4,72 
Research Units (n=13) 10,69 12,00 4,69 
NGOs (n=8) 10,62 15,37 5,62 
Other interest groups (n=17) 14,41 11,00 5,52 
 
The group that names the highest number 
of other network organisations they sup-
port includes the Foreign Ministry, the 
Federal Environment Agency and the Par-
liamentary Commission for Environment, 
Nature and Reactor Safety, the German 
Association of labour unions (DGB), the 
Wuppertal Institute, Germanwatch and the 
Association of Car Producing Industries 
(VdA), i.e. members of all groups are rep-
resented. This corresponds with the ob-
servation of some authors that new policy 
coalitions appeared at least since the early 
90s. In the case of the eco-tax issue coali-
tions came into existence between Green-
peace and the labour union for public ser-
vices (ÖTV), the Green Party cooperated 
with the labour union IG Bauen-Agrar-
Umwelt, and BUND with Misereor, a hu-
manitarian organisation linked to the 
Catholic Church (Reiche and Kebs 1998: 
189-191). 
Table 9: Relative frequency of support between the groups 
 Governmental Units Research Units NGOs 
Other interest 
groups 
Governmental Units 0.421 0.294 0.330 0.262 
Research Units 0.280 0.361 0.125 0.113 
NGOs 0.170 0.144 0.453 0.191 
Other interest groups 0.415 0.183 0.406 0.320 
 
Table 9 demonstrates that the network is 
well integrated. NGOs are integrated like 
the other groups. Even though they have 
opponents in the network, mostly from in-
terest groups associated with business, 
this does not have any consequences for 
information contacts and their support fre-
quencies. 
What does this mean for the position of 
each group in the network in terms of 
power? We asked the participants of the 
questionnaires which organisation they 
consider as most influential. Among those 
ten organisations with the highest reputa-
tion in terms of influence the most fre-
quently mentioned are Greenpeace (3.37), 
the Wuppertal Institute (3.06), the Federal 
Environment Agency (2.96) and the Asso-
ciation of Car Producing Industries (VdA) 
(2.70). This corresponds to the data con-
cerning information exchange and coop-
eration. Here too Greenpeace, the Wup-
pertal Institute and the Federal Environ-
ment Agency are among the ten organisa-
tions with the highest reputation. The dif-
fusion of former activists of the environ-
mental movement in all of these organisa-
tions can be assumed to be in favour of 
policy coordination. 
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Explaining political output by policy networks 
The German contribution to global climate 
change politics has been highly appreci-
ated internationally. We have started the 
analysis of our data with the assumption 
that a well integrated policy network might 
explain proactive environmental policies. 
We have explored the working of the pol-
icy network with regard to inter- and intra-
group cooperation, information exchange, 
as well as conflict patterns and have re-
ferred to the case of the eco-tax legislation 
to verify the data. 
Our findings may be summarized as fol-
lowed: 
The network is divided in environmental 
and economic interests, but it is not frag-
mented. Data demonstrates that levels of 
conflict are low and cooperation and in-
formation exchange is not divided along 
conflict lines. Even though at least the 
eco-tax issue might have been controver-
sial, the network has been open to new 
ecological coalitions and new cooperation 
patterns. The research institutes were in-
fluential in presenting proposals. Espe-
cially the study of the renowned German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), 
conducted for Greenpeace in 1994, is said 
to have been extremely influential in the 
decision-making process. The labour un-
ions have joined forces with NGOs in fa-
vour of its introduction. Cleavages are less 
deep than expected. All groups have ac-
cess in the policy-making process, even 
though the distribution of resources is not 
balanced at all. The data support qualita-
tive research according to which NGOs in 
Germany are integrated and an accepted 
part of the information and support net-
work. Indeed, they are considered to be 
more influential than other interest groups. 
This is supported by the interviews, ac-
cording to which inequality of resources 
does not matter as much as expertise and 
good relations with the government. Even 
though it has been argued that NGOs are 
“low budget” organisations, they seem at 
least partly to compensate weak resources 
by employing mass media for their pur-
poses, forming coalitions with research in-
stitutes and labour unions and targeting 
the government. They are favoured by a 
competitive party system, which allows in-
fluential members of the environmental 
movement to become party politicians. 
Other environmentalists joined research 
institutes. After the 1998 elections some of 
these former NGO representatives have 
become members of parliament and/or of-
ficials in governmental institutions. Even 
though former research suggests that the 
parliamentary political process does not 
explain differences in policy outputs, it is 
obvious that the relation between NGOs 
and governmental units is stronger than 
with other groups, which may be ascribed 
to the political change of 1998. At least 
with regard to German climate change 
policies since the mid 90s, the political 
closeness between the leading organisa-
tions of the network should not be under-
estimated as a component which explains 
political output, besides policy style and 
political culture. Shared basic political be-
liefs among the organisations with the 
highest reputation in the network, namely 
the Öko Institute and the Wuppertal Insti-
tute from the research institutes, the Minis-
try of Environment and the Federal Envi-
ronment Agency from the government 
units, and Greenpeace and BUND from 
the NGOs, may be considered to provide 
the network with preconditions favourable 
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to proactive environmental politics. At the 
same time economic interests are inte-
grated. Thus, the network may be de-
scribed as inclusive, cooperative, and 
open. 
Integration of economic and environmental 
interests may imply that the policy output 
appears as a mere compromise. In the 
case of the eco-tax process German critics 
have complained about the power of inter-
est groups in the environmental policy-
making process. They argue that unre-
lated to the government’s party affiliation, 
every government has to cooperate with 
interest groups from the business sector in 
order to survive (Krebs and Reiche 1996: 
141). From the perspective of radical envi-
ronmentalists, the German government 
has failed to introduce an eco-tax which 
would have had the potential to become a 
means of ecological modernization, as tax 
income is not spent for environmental pro-
tection purposes and actual tariffs are 
much lower than has been demanded. 
Furthermore, the German eco-tax was 
criticised because it lacks incentives to re-
duce CO2 emissions, because it is based 
on the taxation of secondary energy rather 
than primary sources. 
When referring to the situation in other 
countries, critics may become more satis-
fied: the introduction of the eco-tax made 
Germany a forerunner in climate protec-
tion internationally. Although the introduc-
tion was considerably later than in the pio-
neering Scandinavian countries, it gained 
international attention and it is likely that 
further eco-taxes in other countries and 
the EU are triggered. The introduction has 
been a success in terms of green interests 
in so far that the tax has been introduced 
and that the introduction has been de-
coupled from the activities of the EU. 
NGOs and green interests in the govern-
ment and in society have had voice in the 
process and this can not be taken for 
granted with regard to other societies. 
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